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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
1. Allow additur if the increased award is set at the highest
amount a jury could award, similar to the New York pro-
cedure ;41
2. Adopt the Wisconsin practice of giving both parties the option
-the defendant to pay the highest amount, or plaintiff to
accept the lowest amount the jury could award as a matter of
law ;42
3. Allow additur only in cases involving liquidated damages;
4. Permit additur only in action in which there is no constitu-
tional right of jury trial, such as condemnation proceedings. 43
If additur is to be denied altogether, the court should consider the pos-
sibility of new trials on the issue of damages alone under Rule 59 of the
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the historical trend toward increasing supervision of the
courts over jury verdicts, and the almost universal acceptance of re-
mittitur, it is difficult to justify rules which favor correction of an ex-
cessive award but not of an inadequate award. When wisely used in civil
actions, additur avoids the delay and expense of a new trial, and furthers
the legitimate objective of bringing litigation to a speedy and expeditious
end.
GARY L. DAVIS.
PRIVILEGE TO DEFAME: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS
ESTABLISHED A NEW AND IMPORTANT AREA OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-
Petitioner, the New York Times, carried a full page advertisement on
March 9, 1960, entitled, "Heed Their Rising Voices."' The advertisement
made several false and defamatory statements of fact concerning the
activities of the Montgomery, Alabama police. Respondent, the commis-
sioner of police in Montgomery, brought an action for defamation in
Alabama state court, alleging that the statements referred to him in his
official capacity. The trial court found the publication "libelous per se"
and upon proof that the statements were "of and concerning" him, the
respondent was awarded $500,000, the full amount for which he sued.2
nSupra note 15.
12Supra note 16.
"Accord, Kennesaw decision, supra note 31.
'This was an editorial advertisement submitted by a group of civil rights advocates
for the purpose of raising money for the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King
and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. See appendix of majority opinion for
full text of the advertisement. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964).
'At the time this decision was handed down, there were pending in the state courts
of Alabama eleven suits against the respondent in which the aggregate damages
sought were $5,600,000. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 734.
[Vol. 26,
1
Ennis: ew York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1964
RECENT DECISIONS
The decision was upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court.3 On certiorari
the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The publication of a
false and defamatory statement of fact about a public official acting in his
public capacity is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
the press unless actual malice is shown.4 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U. S. 254 (1964).
Defamation of public officials has always presented unique diffi-
culties.5 All courts realize that members of society must be given some
license to go beyond the traditional limits of defamatory speech when
criticizing official activity of public employees. The license is founded
upon the high value, both social and political, of free and unfettered dis-
cussion of matters of public concern. The courts do not agree, however,
on the degree to which the license should be extended.
Prior to the instant case, the majority of state courts had adopted the
doctrine of "fair comment" or "fair criticism." This rule gave a party
discussing a matter of public interest, as in this case the activities of a
public official, the right to make any criticism or statement of opinion
so long as it did not contain a misstatement of fact.7 A "conditional privi-
lege," on the other hand, was granted by a minority of the courts to dis-
cussions of public officials.8 Materials published upon issues which are
conditionally privileged could contain false statements of opinion or fact
as long as there was neither evidence of actual malice nor excessive pub-
lication. The scholarly consensus apparently favors the view adopted by
the minority.9
A conditional privilege is founded upon the public policy which
recognizes the necessity of transmitting true information whenever it is
reasonably necessary for the protection of interests of the public. "In
order that such information may freely be given, it is necessary to afford
protection against liability for misinformation given in an honest and
reasonable effort to protect or advance the interests in question."10
The instant case rendered obsolete the debate between proponents of
'New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).4Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg concurred in reversing the Alabama court.
They did not, however, agree with the majority that the existence of the constitutional
protection should depend upon the speaker's state of mind. The concurring justices
thought the privilege, which the Constitution required, must be absolute.
'Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 903
(1949).
OSee cases Annot., 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 358 (1944).
71 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS § 5.28 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 110 (3rd ed. 1964);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 606, comment b (1938). See generally 1 HARPER AND JAMES,
TORTS § 5.28 (1956); Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEX. L. REV. 41 (1929).
8it appears from counting those cases reviewed in Annot., 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937),
Annot., 150 A.L.R. 350 (1944), and in Noel, supra note 5, that less than one-quarter
of the jurisdictions which have considered this issue are in accord with the minority.
9HARPER AND JAMES, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 5.26; PROSSER, Op. cit. supra note 7,
at § 110; Noel, supra note 5, at 891-896, 897, 903 (1949) ; Hallen, supra note 7, at
61 (1929) ; Smith Charges Against Candidates, 18 MicH. L. REV. 1, 115 (1919).
"03 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Scope Note §§ 593-605 at 240 (1934).
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"fair comment" and "conditional privilege." As stated by Professor
Prosser:
[T]he minority position has just been vindicated and that of the
majority completely overthrown by a decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States declaring that the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of the press includes the qualified privilege
of making false statements of fact about such individuals [public
officers] .11
This qualified privilege created by the Supreme Court is defeasible only
upon proof of actual malice.
The Court's decision to extend protection of the first amendment to
defamatory misstatements about public officials may cause several serious
problems. One such problem which the Court fails to discuss in the
instant case arises from a danger inherent in too great freedom to publish.
This danger comes not from occasional abuse of the duty upon the public
and press to comment on public matters, but rather from the fact that
such expanded freedom may facilitate organized and concerted attacks
on public officials by the use of personal vilification and calculated lies.
The use of libel in such campaigns can have a devastating effect on po-
litical institutions and parties, minority groups, and public persons. 12
The Court's interpretation of the first amendment 13 is principally re-
sponsible for its decision in the instant case. The rule established is the
result of several well-reasoned steps arrived at after consideration of an
"impressive array of history and precedent. '14 The Court reasoned as
follows:
1. Freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the
first amendment. This freedom and the present case must be considered
"against the background of a profound national commitment to the prin-
ciple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."" Such
debate is fundamental to the American system of government. 16
"PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 110.
"2See Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment, 42 COLUM.
L. REV. 1086, 1282 (1942). Professor Riesman explains how the European fascists
took advantage of public discontent and ineffective libel laws, using calculated
falsehoods and smear to make a mockery of public people and political institutions.
This weapon was very effectively used by the Nazi party in their climb to power in
pre-World War II Germany. Are our new libel laws strong enough to stem such
activity should it begin in the United States today? For further examples of possible
problem areas, see notes 20 and 27 infra.
'
3U.S. CONST. amend. 1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."
"New Yorlk Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 735 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
"Id. at 721.
"Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-376 (1927) (concurring opinion).
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2. Neither factual error nor injury to the official reputation will
remove the constitutional safeguard.
3. "If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to re-
move the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct, the com-
bination of the two elements is no less inadequate. '17
After determining that there was sufficient public interest to require
constitutional protection, the Court went on to hold the "balance fair
between public need and private right"18 by qualifying the privilege given
according to the publisher's state of mind.
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule re-
covering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his offi-
cial conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
actual malice-that is, with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.1 9
This qualification was made without reference to precedent or other
authority.
20
Although the instant case is significant because it overturned the
law in a large number of states, the more interesting issue involved is:
What are the possible ramifications of this positive entry into the field
of defamation via the Constitution? The means used by the Supreme
Court to establish this constitutional privilege, as compared to the means
used to establish like privileges through tort law, should afford some
idea of the possible extension of this doctrine.
The privileges that have been developed through tort law are the
result of a balancing process used by the courts. That balancing is one
of the basic issues underlying the extension of such privileges is well
illustrated by a statement from Harper and James' work on torts:
In the law of defamation, as elsewhere, we find a continuous com-
parison of the social value of interests involved and the probable
effect thereon of license or restraint upon statement and discus-
sion. Immunity is granted or withheld on the principle of the
residuum of social convenience deriving from the protection of
one interest at the expense of another.
21
"New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 722.
"Coleman v. McKennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281, 292 (1908).
"New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 726.
2 The fact that no persons may state falsehoods with actual "malice" may prove
but a small measure of protection for the public official. Mr. Justice Black says:
"' 'Malice,' even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to
prove and hard to disprove." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 733
(concurring opinion). The difficulty of proving malice in certain fact situations
is easily imaginable. Consider a case in which the crusading newspaperman becomes
a martyr as he pursues a popular cause against a greedy politician. A jury's investi-
gation of the journalist's state of mind probably would not be conducive to justice
in this situation. Wbere the defaming publisher is backed by a strong community
sentiment, he may indeed have a de facto, absolute privilege.
211 HARPER AND JAMES, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 5.25.
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This same proposition was stated by the Michigan court in Lawrence v.
Fox when the court said: "The ultimate problem in the law of defamation
is the balancing of one man's interests against another man's acts. '22
Thus, in tort law, a balance must be struck between an interest which de-
serves protection-of publisher, receiver, or general public-and the pos-
sible injury which may result from a particular publication. The social
value of the various interests will determine the precise point at which
balance is obtained which in turn dictates the degree of privilege to be
granted. The interest which underlies discussion of public officials is the
proper selection and direction of our public servants. Opposed to this
is an interest based on the necessity of not discouraging qualified men
from entering public service for fear of attack on their reputations. The
former of these interests is believed to be of greater social value. To
insure that this interest is given protection commensurate with its greater
value, the right of fair comment or a conditional privilege is extended to
statements made in its behalf. Efficient operation of the legislative, ad-
ministrative, and judicial branches of government are interests of such
great value that absolute privileges are given to statements made within
their scope.
23
The Supreme Court has used a balancing process on many occa-
sions.24 It is believed by some to be the very basis of determining first
amendment freedoms. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with regard to the inter-
pretation of the first amendment, has said:
Absolute rules would eventually lead to absolute exceptions and
such exceptions would eventually corrode the rules. The demands
of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interests of
national security, are better served by candid and informed
weighing of competing interests within the confines of a judicial
process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-
Euclidian problems to be solved. 25
Such weighing of competing interests must have been used by the Court
to arrive at its decision in the instant case. On one hand the Court
found a high value in unrestricted discussion of the activities of public
officials. On the other there was the possibility of harm to the reputa-
tion of public officials by false and defamatory attacks. The fact that
the Court qualified the right to speak on these matters is strong evidence
2 2Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 97 N.W.2d 719, 720 (1959).
nThe Supreme Court itself has indulged in tort law balancing. In Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564, 575 (1959), the Court held that an utterance of a federal officer is absolute-
ly privileged if made "within the outer perimeter" of his duties. In this case the
Court saw the public interest which deserved protection as the "fearless, vigorous, and
effective administration of policies of government."
2 4There seems to be considerable discussion concerning ad hoe balancing of interests
under the first amendment. A good survey of the problems and the cases in which
such balancing has been used is found in Frantz, The First Amendment in the
Balance, 71 YALE L. J. 1424 (1962).
2Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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that the rule as finally set down by the majority is the result of an in-
formed evaluation of the various interests.
The balancing processes employed to find constitutional and tort
privileges are essentially the same. An examination of balancing, how-
ever, does not fully explore the issues which are relevant to a meaningful
comparison of the two approaches.
Prior to the instant case libelous publications had not been considered
as being within the scope of the first amendment. 26 As far as the Consti-
tution was concerned, publishers of defamatory material were responsible,
both civilly and criminally, for any injury to the reputations of others.
In the instant case, however, the Court found it necessary to expand the
traditional area of speech protected by the first amendment. 2 Libelous
statements will now be protected if they are made upon proper occasions.
The nature of these occasions must be gleaned from the instant case.
The Court initially stated that all discussion upon public questions
qualifies for first amendment protection. But, this assertion is so broad
and poorly defined that it is of little value. The Court was more specific
when it said that "the present advertisement, as an expression of griev-
ance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would
clearly seem to qualify for the constitutional protection. '28 On the basis
of this statement, the advertisement should have qualified for constitu-
tional protection even though no public official was involved. Should
not all similar discussion of issues of immediate public concern be granted
constitutional protection? The Court answered yes when it declared that
the Kansas decision, Coleman v. MacKennan,29 established a "like rule."
The Court quoted with approval from the Kansas opinion that "this privi-
lege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public
concern."3 0 While the Court in the instant case was not called upon to
22 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 886 (8th ed. 1927) "The constitutional
liberty of speech and of the press, as we understand it, implies a right to freely
utter and publish whatever the citizen may please, and to be protected against any
responsibility for so doing, except so far as such publications, from their blasphemy,
obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public offense, or as by their falsehood
and malice they may injuriously affect the standing, reputation or pecuniary in-
terests of individuals.''
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the majority in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 255-256 (1952) said: "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention of which have never been thought to raise any con-
stitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, and libelous,
and the insulting or 'fighting words' . . . . In the majority opinion of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 710 n.6, seven cases are cited in which the
Court had announced with clarity that the common law liability for libel and slander
did not abridge the freedom of speech or press.
nIt is an interesting speculation as to the effect the decision in the instant case might
have upon those classes of speech that have been lumped together with libel by
COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 24; Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 26; Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942), all of which held such classes were not deserving of constitutional protection.
2New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 721.
OSupra note 18.
'*Instant case at 727; quoting from Colman v. MacKennan, supra note 1, 98 Pac., at
285.
1964]
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consider matters beyond those which pertain directly to public officials,
the decision contains a basis from which constitutional protection might
be granted to all manner of discussion in significant areas of public con-
cern.
3
'
Tort law has also recognized that debate upon issues of public con-
cern deserves special protection. Because the two approaches to matters
of privilege are similar in this additional respect, the large body of tort
law which now defines matters of public concern should be used to deter-
mine those areas in which libel will be given constitutional protection.3 2
Among those matters which tort law has found to be of sufficient public
concern to receive some protection are the activities of public employees,"3
work to be paid for out of public funds,34 management of institutions such
as schools,' 5 and admission or disbarment of attorneys. 36 Private enter-
prise becomes a proper subject for public comment to the extent that it
affects the public interest.' 7 Even comment upon artistic works is said to
come within the scope of public concern.'8 While it is not suggested that
all of the matters mentioned above must be adjudged matters of public
concern for constitutional purposes, they should be considered as areas
of possible constitutional protection.
The important elements and methods of analysis necessary to the
determination of privilege are the same in both tort and constitutional
law. The first step the courts must take, using either approach to privi-
lege, is to determine whether the particular discussion pertains to matters
of public concern. If so, this discussion is drawn within an area to which
"Pedrich, Freedom of the Press and the Laze of Libel: The Modern Revised Transla-
tion, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 581 at 591-593 (1964), in a more lengthy discussion, came
to nearly the same conclusion.
3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 606, 608, 610 (1938) illustrates a wide range of public
activities which are looked upon as matters of public concern. The issues of public
concern considered by the restatement would seem to be substantially the same as
those subjects which should enjoy constitutional protection. Numerous occasions and
fact situations which have been considered of sufficient public concern to be granted
some degree of privilege are considered in PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 110,
and in HARPER AND JAMES, Op. Cit. supra note 10, at § 5.26.
'
2 Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 172 N.E. 139, 72 A.L.R. 913 (1930),
(High School football coach).
'Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n., 126 W.Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837, 150 A.L.R. 348
(1943).
'Clarke v. MeBain, 299 Mo. 77 252 S.W. 428 (1923).
"Kennedy v. Item Co., 197 La. 1050, 3 So. 2d 175 (1941); Spriggs v. Cheyenne News-
paper, 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801 (1947).
"Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440
(1955). The affairs of a private corporation are matters of public concern, particu-
larly so with respect to operations that will cause large unemployment. The Connecti-
cut court quoted with approval from Coleman v. MacKennan, supra note 18, at 289,
that this rule "must apply to all officers and agents of government, municipal,
state, and national; to the management of all public institutions, educational, charit-
able, and penal; to conduct of all corporate enterprises affected with a public interest,
transportation, banking, insurance; and to innumerable other subjects involving
public welfare.''
T In Carr v. Hood (K.B. 1808), as reported in Tarbart v. Tipper, 1 Camp. 350, 355,
170 Eng. Rep. 981, 983 n. (K.B. 1808), Lord Ellenborough established a rational
for granting a privilege to the work of literary critics. He stated that literary critics
do a great public service by checking the dissemination of bad taste and preventing
people from wasting both time and money upon trash.
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protection is granted. The license to publish, however, does not become
absolute because this discussion is within the favored sphere. Freedom
of speech and the right to defame will then be tempered to the extent a
balance is achieved between public and private interests.
It is submitted that because the elements and methods of analysis
which form the basis of the constitutional approach to privilege are sub-
stantially the same as those used by the tort approach, the privileges re-
quired by the Constitution should correspond to those which have been
developed through tort law. The instant case, by extending the freedoms
guaranteed by the first amendment, has created a new foundation upon
which an extensive body of privileges may be built.39
BRUCE L. ENNIS.
LEGAL AID PLANS OF LABOR UNIONS ARE AN EXERCISE OF FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND Do NOT CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ETHICS.-The
defendant labor union operated a Legal Aid Department whereby union
representatives and investigators advised injured union members to
retain a particular attorney. The representatives and investigators
occasionally carried blank contracts of employment and photos of settle-
ment checks from previous lawsuits to persuade injured members to en-
gage the attorney. The attorney's contingent fee was set by the union and
from it the attorney paid for the investigative services performed by the
union.1 The Montana Bar Association charged the union and several non-
resident attorneys with a conspiracy to engage in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law in Montana. The trial court enjoined defendant union from
fee fixing, practicing law and soliciting claims. Defendant lawyers and
their agents were enjoined from soliciting. Plaintiff alleged in part that
the decree rendered in the trial court was inadequate because it allowed
defendant union to continue investigating claims and recommending law-
" November 23, 1964, the Supreme Court handed down a sequel to the instant case.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 4019 (1964). Appellant, the District
Attorney of Orleans Parish allegedly defamed eight judges of the criminal district
court of the parish. He was convicted of criminal defamation. The court over-
turned the Louisiana decision, applying the same standard to criminal libel prosecu-
tions as applied to civil action in the instant case. It said "only those false state-
ments made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded
by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions." Gar-
rison v. State of Louisiana, supra at 4022.
In the Garrison case the Court recognized for the first time that deliberate false-
hood may be used as an effective political tool. However, this issue was passed over
summarily as the Court indicated that their limitation of the right to comment by
''actual malice"I would take care of any such problems. See notes 12 and 20, supra.
'The court did not state the facts in the instant case but said they were essentially
the same as in Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508
(1950); Doughty v. Grills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (1952); In re Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958). The statement
of facts here is composed from facts common to those three cases. The activities of
the union as described will hereinafter be referred to as the "plan."
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